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The global welfare implications of home market effects in trade models with im-
perfect competition are little understood. This paper proposes a simple model in
which such implications can be easily analyzed. It shows an overall tendency of
imperfectly competitive sectors to inefficiently cluster in locations that offer
market access advantages. The more so the stronger the market power of firms as
well as the intensity of increasing returns to scale and the lower the trade costs.
As such features are likely to differ widely across sectors, those results provide
theoretical ground to the promotion of regional policies that are also sector-
specific and not only region-specific as currently in the EU.
J.E.L. Classification:  F12, L13, R13
Keywords:  economic integration, specialization, home market effect,
regional disparities, regional policy1 Introduction
Market access plays a key role in many recent models of international trade.
Such models study the impact of frictionsin goodsand factors mobility on the
location of imperfectly competitive industries in the presence of increasing
returns to scale (Helpman and Krugman, 1985). Their central result is the
so-called home market or market size e¤ect (henceforth, HME), according to
which, in the case of a two-country economy, the location with larger local
demand  succeeds  in  attracting  a  more  than  proportionate  share  of  firms  in
the aforementioned industries. In the case of more than two countries, rather
than local demand, what matters is overall market access (Krugman, 1993).
For example, a small central country may have better overall market access
than a large peripheral one and thus, despite its local demand disadvantage,
may  end  up  attracting  a  larger  share  of  imperfectly  competitive  firms.1  This
pattern  of  demand-driven  specialization  maps  into  trade  flows  and  generates
the theoretical prediction that large central countries should be net exporters
of goods produced under increasing returns and imperfect competition.2
From  an  empirical  viewpoint,  those  predictions  seem  to  find  some  sup-
port in the data. For example, Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (1998; 2001)
argue that the HME is crucial to understand the empirical success of gravity
equations,  which  explain  bilateral  trade  flows  in  terms  of  incomes  and  dis-
tance between trade partners. Using disaggregated trade data from Statistics
Canada World Database, they show that the HME appears to be relevant in
both  differentiated  and  homogeneous  goods  sectors,  even  though  more  in  the
former than in the latter. Using disaggregated data on UK-US trade, Weder
(1997)  finds  that  relative  demand  has  a  positive  relationship  with  net  exports
as  implied  by  the  HME.  Davis  and  Weinstein  (1998;  1999)  find  evidence  of
the HME in disaggregated trade data between OECD countries. Based on
disaggregated production data from Eurostat, Trionfetti (1998), Midelfart-
Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and Venables (2000) as well as Brülhart and
1Notice that, as a consequence, with more than three countries, it is not even clear the
benchmark  against  which  to  measure  the  local  presence  of  imperfectly  competitive  firms.
In other words, “more than proportionate” with respect to what?
2This implication derives even more strongly from ‘new economic geography’ models
(Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999), which show that, in the presence of demand
and  cost  linkages  between  factors  and  firms,  the  HME  can  be  powerful  enough  to  cause
catastrophic agglomeration of imperfectly competitive increasing-return sectors once trade
costs fall below a certain threshold.
7Trionfetti  (2001)  argue  that  market  access  is  significant  in  explaining  EU
industrial specialization. Finally, analizing disaggregated industry data for
Canadian  and  US  manufacturing,  also  Head  and  Mayer  (forthcoming)  find
supportive evidence for the HME.3
From a theoretical viewpoint, the focus is on the two-country case. The
underpinnings of the HME are unveiled by Krugman (1980) and Helpman
and Krugman (1985) with respect to imperfectly competitive industries char-
acterized by product differentiation and free entry. Helpman (1990) qualifies
previous results by stressing the demand conditions under which the HME
materializes in those sectors. These conditions require the cross-elasticity
between  varieties  of  a  differentiated  good  to  be  larger  than  the  overall  price-
elasticity  of  demand  for  the  differentiated  good  as  a  whole.  Davis  (1998)
points out the relevance of the actual incidence of trade costs in all sectors
and shows that, when transportation costs on perfectly competitive goods are
considered, the HME may disappear altogether because trade cost in those
sectors can effectively limit the mobility of firms in differentiated sectors.
Feenstra  et  al.  (1998)  show  that  there  is  nothing  crucial  in  product  differ-
entiation and free entry per se in that the HME can be expected even in
homogenous-good sectors with restricted entry. All that matters is the pres-
ence of positive price-cost margins. Finally, Head, Mayer, and Ries (2000)
point  out  that,  when  goods  are  differentiated  according  to  their  location  in
the geographical rather than in product space, the HME might again disap-
pear.
To sum up, the HME seems a robust implication of trade models with
imperfect competition even though its actual intensity is likely to vary from
sector to sector depending on returns to scale, trade costs, entry barriers and
elasticities of demand and substitution.4 This statement, however, is subject
to two main caveats. First, it holds if we focus on a sector insulated from the
rest of the economy, that is, the HME is a partial equilibrium phenomenon
that might be washed away by general equilibrium interactions as stressed
by  Helpman  (1990)  or  Davis  (1998).  Second,  it  can  be  defined  rigorously
only  with  two  countries  that  differ  in  nothing  but  size,  which  is  not  the
case when technology or factor-abundance driven advantages are present or
3While  finding  supportive  evidence  for  the  HME,  Head  and  Mayer  (forthcoming)  stress
the overall better empirical performance of an alternative theoretical explanation grounded
on  country-based  product  differentiation  (the  so-called  Armington  model).  Head,  Mayer,
and Ries (2000) clarify the relation between such model and the HME.
4See, also, Trionfetti (1998) as well as Head, Mayer, and Ries (2000) for recent surveys.
8when  products  are  differentiated  according  to  geographical  location  as  in  the
counterexample by Head, Mayer, and Ries (2000).
Nonetheless, despite its theoretical success and its promising explanatory
power, the welfare properties of the HME are still little understood (see, e.g.,
Braunerhjelm et al., 2000). In particular, the literature does not provide
any answer to the fundamental question of whether the spatial distribution
of  economic  activities  implied  by  the  HME  is  efficient  for  the  economy  as  a
whole.  The  aim  of  the  present  paper  is  to  give  a  first  answer  to  that  question
and to show how that answer can be used to discuss the desirability of current
regional  policies  that,  in  most  cases,  aim  at  promoting  the  location  of  firms
in peripheral regions as markets get increasingly integrated.
In particular, the paper proposes a simple two-country two-factor model
with a monopolistically competitive sector. To focus on the implications of
the HME and in the light of the two caveats discussed above, the monopolisti-
cally competitive market is insulated from all other markets and one country
is  a  scaled-up  version  of  the  other.  Monopolistic  competitive  firms  are  mod-
eled  à  la  Ottaviano,  Tabuchi  and  Thisse  (forthcoming),  but  differently  from
this paper their location is driven by footloose capital mobility rather than
by workers’ migration. This allows for the description of a realistic situation
in which capital is freely mobile between countries while labor is not. The
model reveals an overall tendency of the monopolistically competitive sector
to inefficiently cluster in the country that offers better market access. The
more  so  the  stronger  the  market  power  of  firms  as  well  as  the  intensity  of  in-
creasing returns to scale and the lower the trade costs. As these features are
likely  to  differ  widely  across  sectors,  those  results  provide  theoretical  ground
to  the  promotion  of  regional  policies  that  are  both  region-  and  sector-specific.
The paper is in six additional parts. Section 2 describes regional state
aid in the EU as a natural policy background for the theoretical analysis.
Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 shows how the HME arises as a
market equilibrium result. Section 5 studies the welfare properties of the
market equilibrium with respect to the level of trade barriers. After pointing
out that also the efficient allocation of firms exhibits a HME, it argues that
the  market  pattern  of  firms’  location  is  suboptimally  biased  in  favor  of  the
larger (‘central’) country, the more so the lower trade costs are. Section 6
shows that subsidies towards the small (‘peripheral’) country can be used to
restore  efficiency.  Their  amount  falls  as  integration  is  deepened,  but  rises
with the distance between center and periphery. Section 7 concludes.
92 Policy background: EU regional interven-
tion
To  define  the  issues  at  stake,  a  natural  example  is  the  case  of  the  EU,  which
devotes staggering amounts of money to regional objectives. For istance,
in 1997 the total budget of the European Union consisted of the equivalent
of 87.6 billion Euro, funded mainly through VAT (42.3%), direct member
states’ contribution that are proportional to their GDP (40.3%), and custom
duties on imports from outside the Union (16.5%). Most of the budget was
devoted to two areas of intervention: 47% to the Commom Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP) and 36.3% to Structural Funds (SFs). In relative terms, the total
endowment of the SFs corresponds to 1.2% of the joint GNP of EU members
states and for the period from 1994 to 1999 it reached almost 154 billion Eu-
ros (at 1994 prices). As to SFs, two main general categories of expenditures
can  be  identified.  Economic  aid  (76.4%)  aims  at  improving  the  attractive-
ness  of  regions  to firms    both  indirectly  through  the  provision  of  public  goods
(mainly infrastructures) and directly through the compensation of individual
economic enterprises. Social aid (9.9%) targets regional unemployment and
human-capital accumulation through education and skill upgrading. Since
member countries’ contributions to the EU budget are proportional to their
respective GDPs, the geographical allocation implies a clear pattern of inter-
national redistribution especially to the advantage of the countries at the EU
periphery, namely Ireland, Greece and Portugal, as well as of interregional
redistribution mainly to the advantage of the less developed peripheral re-
gions of Italy, Spain and Eastern Germany. Such pattern is clearly visible
in Figure 1, which plots the SFs coverage of population across countries as
a function of an index of geographical peripherality for the planning period
2000-2006.5
The periphery bias of EU SFs is accompanied by the direct control over
5In Figure 1 the chosen measure of the peripherality of a country is the distance of
its capital city from the capital of Germany (the large central country). Such measure
is admittedly rough, but more sophisticated indexes would not alter the basic center-
periphery pattern revealed by the picture. Population coverage refers to Objective 1
(regions  suffering  general  underdevelopment  as  signalled  by  per-capita  incomes  below  75%
of  the  EU  average)  plus  Objective  2  (regions  suffering  from  a  concentration  of  declining
industries  as  measured  by  observable  job  losses  in  specific  sectors).  The  source  of  data  is
European Commission (2001a).
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Figure 1: EU structural funds
11members states’ regional aid aimed at supporting productive (initial) invest-
ment and job creation.6 This is achieved through state aid caps, that is,
upper (percentage) limits to goverment support to private investments no
matter whether the aid comes from local, regional, national or EU sources.
As SFs state aid caps follow the logic of spatial concentration and rule out
support  confined  to  individual  firms  or  areas  of  activity.  The  aim  is  to  fos-
ter  the  development  of  less-favoured  regions  by  encouraging  firms  to  settle
there  and,  in  any  case,  to  reduce  the  effects  of  integration  on  periphery-to-
center relocation. The broad principle is that “[n]o trading relationship will
work properly without agreed rules on the granting of subsidies” (European
Commission, 1995) and it is implemented by Articles 92-94 of the Treaty of
Rome  (1957).  In  particular,  as  clarified  by  the  European  Commission  (1995):
“Article  92  specifies  that  state  aids  which  distort  or  threaten  to  distort  com-
petition  by  favouring  certain  companies  or  the  production  of  specific  goods,
and  which  affect  trade  between  member  states,  are  incompatible  with  the
common market”. Figure 2 depicts regional state aid caps across member
states as a function of peripherality.7 It matches Figure 1 in showing that,
as pointed out by Braunerhjelm et al. (2000), “[t]he overall pattern of EU
regional policy spending follows precisely the pattern that might be expected
of the Commission, which is trying to achieve regional convergence [a.k.a.,
cohesion] in terms of EU GDP per capita”.8
What has trade theory to say about the above pictures? Is the logic
of redistribution from center to periphery sound as the EU faces ongoing
economic  integration?  If  so,  is  it  about  equity,  efficiency,  or  both?
As a good approximation we can divide the possible answers into two
main  positions.  The  first  is  based  on  the  neoclassical  world  of  constant  re-
turns to scale and perfect competitition. In this world countries specialize
according to their comparative advantage and each of them as a whole at-
tains  its  efficient  pattern  of  production.  In  other  words,  trade  integration  is
Pareto improving. Nevertheless, within the same country there may be gain-
6Note that, generally speaking, the European Commission rules out any form of oper-
ating  aid  to  firms.
7The measure of the peripherality is the same as in Figure 1. The state aid cap of a
country is selected as the highest regional state aid cap within that country. The source
of data is European Commission (2001b).
8Such pattern cannot but be enhanced by the EU prospective enlargement towards
East. Indeed, the Europe agreements already allow all ten Central European and Baltic
countries  to  define  their  entire  territories  as  less-favoured  regions  (Objective  1).
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Figure 2: EU state aid caps
13ers and losers. If disadvantaged interests are geographically concentrated,
then there is a need for interregional transfers based on equity considera-
tions.  Notice,  however,  that  the  effects  of  integration  (whether  positive  or
negative)  should  be  stronger  in  central  regions  that,  by  definition,  are  closer
to international markets. At the international level, a large domestic market
reduces the gains from trade integration so that, again based only on equity
considerations, if anything, large countries should be compensated by small
ones. Thus, the neoclassical paradigm provides little support to center-to-
periphery  redistribution  both  on  equity  and  efficiency  grounds.
The second position considers the world of increasing returns to scale and
imperfect competition. As discussed in the introduction, this is the realm
of  the  HME,  that  is  (imperfect)  trade  integration  makes  firms  relocate  from
peripheral  to  central  regions.  This  affects  negatively  the  former  and  positively
the  latter.  The  reason  is  that  firms  have  market  power  and  command  rents  in
terms  of  prices  set  above  marginal  costs.  These  rents  are  extracted  by  firms
from  consumers  and  reduce  the  welfare  of  a  country  when  the  firms  and  the
consumers  involved  belong  to  that  same  country.  On  the  contrary,  when  firms
and  consumers  are  in  different  countries,  those  rents  increase  the  welfare  of
the  country  to  which  firms  belong.  As  a  result,  countries  benefit  from  the
expansion of their imperfectly competitive export sectors (direct rent shifting)
as well as from an inflow of formerly foreign firms in those sectors in so far
as  rents  are  not  entirely  repatriated  (indirect  rent  shifting)  and  the  inflow
lowers domestic consumer prices (Brander and Spencer, 1984; Helpman and
Krugman, 1989; Brander, 1995). Thus, with imperfect competition, center-
to-periphery relocation implies indeed that trade integration favors central
countries more than peripheral ones, which may even lose. This provides
equity-based support to center-to-periphery redistribution.
Compared with the foregoing results this paper moves one step further
and  identifies  precise  sectoral  conditions  under  which  center-to-periphery  re-
distribution  is  desirable  not  only  on  equity  but  also  on  efficiency  grounds.
When such conditions are met, deeper trade integration enhances spatial
inefficiency,  thus  increasing  the  need  for  redistribution.  At  the  same  time,
however, it reduces the intensity of redistribution required. While these in-
sights support the EU approach to regional intervention, at the same time
they  stress  its  incompleteness.  Indeed,  in  so  far  as  industry-specific  charac-
teristics  are  likely  to  determine  the  practical  relevance  of  spatial  inefficiency,
regional  policies  should  be  not  only  region-specific,  as  they  currently  are  in
the  EU,  but  also  sector-specific.
143 The model
The analytical framework is based on the monopolitically competitive model
put forth by Ottaviano and Thisse (2001) as well as Ottaviano, Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002).9 The economy consists of two countries, H and F, which are
endowed  with  two  factors,  capitalK  and  laborL.  To  fit  the  European  situa-
tion,  capital  and  labor  differ  in  terms  of  international  mobility.  In  particular,
labor is assumed to be geographically immobile. Its total stock equals L, and
it is evenly distributed so that a ±L workers reside and work in country H.
On the contrary, capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile, it is owned by
workers, its total stock equals K, and it is distributed so that ¾K units are
owned by country H residents (with ¾ 2 (0;1)) while °K units are used in
countryH  production  (with°  2[0;1]).  Hence,(°¡¾)K>0  (<0)  measures
capital  inflows  to  (outflows  from)  countryH  from  (to)  countryF.  Since
the focus of the analysis is on the HME, we are interested in situations in
which one ‘central’ country (say H) is proportionately larger than the other
‘peripheral’ one (say F). This requires to set ± = ¾ > 1=2.
In the economy there are two sectors, modern and traditional. The mod-
ern  sector  is  capital  intensive  and  supplies  a  horizontally  differentiated  good
under increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. In particu-
lar,  there  is  an  endogenous  mass  of  firmsN,  each  producing  a  single  variety
of the differentiated good by means of a fixed amountÁ of capitalK. The
traditional sector produces a homogeneous good under constant returns to
scale and perfect competition. It uses labor L as the only input with one unit
of L required to produce one unit of output. This good is freely traded and is
chosen as the numéraire. On the contrary, the varieties of the modern sector
are traded at a cost of ¿ units of the numéraire per unit shipped between the
two countries.
Preferences are identical across individuals and described by the following
quasi-linear indirect utility function which is symmetric in all varieties:










9The model adopted reproduces the basic features of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) using dif-
ferent functional forms. As discussed in Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), compared
with the standard CES implementation of Dixit and Stiglitz’s insights, the present model
comparative advantage lies in neater comparative statics results and more straightfoward








+ y + q0
where p(i) is the price of variety i 2 [0;N], y the consumer’s income, and q0
her initial endowment of the numéraire. In (1), a > 0 expresses the intensity
of  preferences  for  the  differentiated  product  with  respect  to  the  numéraire;
b > 0 means that the representative consumer is biased toward a dispersed
consumption  of  varieties,  thus  reflecting  a  love  for  variety;c>0  expresses  the
substitutability between varieties so that the higher c, the closer substitutes
the varieties. Finally, the initial endowment q0 in the numéraire is assumed to
be large enough for the consumption of the numéraire to be strictly positive
at the market equilibrium and optimal solutions.
Labor market clearing implies that the number nH  of  firms  belonging  to
the modern sector and located in country H is equal to:
nH = °K=Á (2)
so  that  the  number  of  firms  inF  is
nF = (1 ¡ °)K=Á (3)
Consequently,  the  total  number  of  firms  (varieties)  in  the  economy  is  fixed
by endowments and technology and equal to N = K=Á.
Entry  and  exit  are  free  so  that  profits  are  zero  in  equilibrium.  Hence,
(2)  and  (3)  imply  that  any  change  in  the  number  of  firms  located  in  one
country originates from a corresponding change in the locally employed stock
of capital. By (2) and (3), the demand and supply of capital in each country
are equal. As a result, the corresponding equilibrium returns to capital are
determined  by  a  bidding  process  among  firms  which  ends  when  no  firm  can
earn  a  strictly  positive  profit  at  the  equilibrium  market  prices.
Firms are assumed to take advantage of positive trade costs to segment
markets,  that  is,  each  firm  sets  a  price  specific  to  the  market  in  which  its
product is sold. This assumption follows from empirical work showing that,
even  within  a  unified  economic  area,  firms  succeed  to  price  discriminate  be-
tween spatially separated markets (McCallum, 1995; Head and Mayer, 2000).
As  shown  below,  in  equilibrium  arbitrage  is  not  profitable  to  third  parties.
In what follows, we focus on country H. Things pertaining to country
F can be derived by symmetry. Using the assumption of symmetry between
16varieties  and  Roy’s  identity,  individual  demands  for  a  representative  firm  in
H are given by:
qHH = a ¡ (b + cN)pHH + cPH (4)
and
qHF = a ¡ (b + cN)pHF + cPF (5)
where pHH  (pHF  )  is  the  price  set  inH  (F)  by  a  firm  located  inH  and
PH ´ nH pHH + nF pFH
PF ´ nH pHF + nF pFF
Clearly, PH=N and PF=N can be interpreted as the price indices prevailing
in countries H and F.
A  representative  firm  inH  maximizes  its  profits,  which,  after  using  (4)
and  (5),  are  defined  by:
¦H = pHH [a ¡ (b + cN)pHH + cPH] ¾L + (6)
(pHF ¡ ¿) [a ¡ (b + cN)pHF + cPF] (1 ¡ ¾)L ¡ ÁrH
where rH is the return to capital prevailing in H.
Market  prices  are  obtained  by  maximizing  profits  while  capital  returns
are  determined  as  described  above  by  equating  the  resulting  profits  to  zero.
Since  we  have  a  continuum  of  firms,  each  one  is  negligible  in  the  sense  that  its
action  has  no  impact  on  the  market.  Hence,  when  choosing  its  prices,  a  firmin
H accurately neglects the impact of its decision over the two price indices PH
and PF  .  In  addition,  because  firms  sell  differentiated  varieties,  each  one  has
some  monopoly  power  in  that  it  faces  a  demand  function  with  finite  elasticity.
On the other hand, since the price index enters the demand function as an
additive  term  (see  (4)  and  (5)),  a  firm  must  account  for  the  distribution  of
the  firms’  prices  through  some  aggregate  statistics,  given  here  by  the  average
market  price,  in  order  to  find  its  equilibrium  price.  As  a  consequence,  the
market solution is given by a Nash equilibrium with a continuum of players in
which  prices  are  interdependent:  each  firm  neglects  its  impact  on  the  market
but is aware that the market as a whole has a non-negligible impact on its
behavior.
Since  profit  functions  are  concave  in  own  price,  solving  the  first  order  con-






















which  depend  on  the  total  number  of  active  firms  as  well  as  on  their  distri-
bution between the two countries.
Substracting¿  from  (9)  and  (10),  we  see  that  firms’  prices  net  of  trade
costs are positive regardless of their spatial distribution if and only if




The  same  condition  must  hold  for  consumers  inF  (H)  to  buy  from  firms  inH
(F), i.e. for the demand (5) evaluated at the prices (7) and (8) to be positive
for all °. From now on, condition (11) is assumed to hold. Consequently, we
consider a setting in which there is a priori intra-industry trade.
Using  (11)  we  observe  that  more  firms  in  the  economy  lead  to  lower  mar-
ket prices for the same spatial distribution (°;1 ¡ °) because there is more
competition in each local market. Similarly, both the prices charged by local
and  foreign  firms  fall  when  the  mass  of  local  firms  increases  because  com-
petition  is  fiercer.  Equilibrium  prices  also  rise  when  the  degree  of  product
differentiation,  inversely  measured  byc,  increases  provided  that  (11)  holds.
Moreover, it can be easily checked that pHF ¡ pHH < ¿ (i.e., there is dump-
ing) so that the prohibition of arbitrage associated with the assumption of
segmented markets is not binding.
Finally, local sales rise with ¿ because of the higher protection enjoyed
by  the  local  firms  but  exports  fall  for  the  same  reason.  By  using  (6),  (7),
and  (9),  it  is  easy  to  check  that  the  equilibrium  operating  profits  earned  by
a  firm  established  inH  on  each  separated  market  are  as  follows:
¦HH = (b + cN) p
2
HH ¾L
where ¦HH denotes  the  profits  earned  inH  while  the  profits  made  from
selling in F are
¦HF = (b + cN) (pHF ¡ ¿)
2 (1 ¡ ¾)L
18Thus,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  firms  in  one  country  decreases  the
operating  profits  of  local  sales  due  to  tougher  local  competition:  the  equi-
librium price falls as well as the quantity of each variety bought by each
consumer.
The individual consumer surplus SH in country H associated with the
equilibrium prices (7) and (10) is then as follows (a symmetric expression
holds in country F):











[° pHH + (1 ¡ °) pFH]
2N
2
which  can  be  shown  to  be  quadratic  in°.  Differentiating  twice  this  expression
with respect to ° shows that SH(°) is concave. Furthermore, (11) implies
that SH(°) is always increasing in ° over the interval [0;1]. Hence, as more
firms  enter  inH,  the  surplus  of  residents  rises  because  local  competition
becomes fiercer; however, this effect gets weaker and weaker as the number
of  local  firms  increases.
The equilibrium return to capital prevailing in country H can be ob-







[2aÁ + ¿cK(1 ¡°)]
2¾L (13)
+[2aÁ ¡ 2¿bÁ ¡¿cK(1 ¡°)]
2 (1 ¡ ¾)L
o
which is also quadratic in °. Standard, but cumbersome, investigations reveal
that rH(°) is convex and decreasing in °. In other words, the equilibrium
return  to  capital  wage  falls  with  the  local  number  of  firms  so  that,  while
SH(°)  rises,rH(°)  decreases  with°.  This  effect  gets  weaker  and  weaker  as  the
number  of  local  firms  increases  because  the  larger  their  number,  the  weaker
the marginal impact of a new entrant on the intensity of local competition.
Moreover, inspection of the square bracketed terms reveals that operating
profits  per  unit  sold  are  larger  on  domestic  than  on  distant  sales  and  the
more  so  the  smaller  the  fraction  of  domestic  firms.
4 The market outcome
We  are  now  ready  to  determine  the  equilibrium  location  of  firms  as  the
result  of  the  international  allocation  of  capital.  Since  it  is  capital  flows  that
19determine  the  location  of  firms,  an  equilibrium  arises  when  no  capital  owner
can earn strictly higher returns by changing the country serviced by her
capital endowment. This happens for 0 < ° < 1 whenever capital returns
are equalized in the two countries:
rH(°) = rF(°) (14)
and for ° = 1 [° = 0] whenever rH(1) ¸ rF(1) [rF(0) ¸ rH(0)].10 In these
latter cases the modern sector is clustered in one country only, with the other
country completely specialized in the production of the traditional good.
Using (13) as well as the corresponding expression for country F in (14),
the  differential  return  on  capital  can  be  expressed  as:
rH(°) ¡ rF(°) = C
n





2(2bÁ+cK)]>0.  The  differential  is,  thus,  a
decreasing linear function of °.
The right hand side of (15) shows that the equilibrium spatial allocation
of capital is determined by the interaction of the two terms inside the curly
bracket.  The  first  term  depends  on  the  spatial  distribution  of  consumers  (¾)
while it is independent from the location of firms (°). Since the coefficient of
(¾¡1=2) ispositive in so far as (11) holds, that term measures a market access
advantage due to trade costs saving: were the overall spatial distribution of
firms  to  mirror  the  distribution  of  consumers  (°=¾),  it  would  nonetheless
be better to be located in the larger country because, as mentioned above,
operating  profits  per  unit  sold  are  larger  on  domestic  than  on  distant  sales.
This is not necessarily true when there is a more than proportionate presence
of  firms  in  the  larger  country  (°  >  ¾).  In  that  case,  the  second  term  in
(15) points out that there is a market crowding penalty, which derives from
the  fact  that,  as  the  fraction  of  firms  in  the  larger  market  grows,  operating
profits  per  unit  sold  fall  on  domestic  sales  and  rise  on  distant  ones  (see  (13)).
This increases the incentive to export and the associated trade cost burden.
Indeed,  if  no  country  offered  better  market  access  than  the  other  (¾=1=2),
then  the  operating  profits  maximizing  allocation  of  firms  would  mirror  the
spatial disitribution of consumers (° = ¾) as that would minimize trade
costs.
10Since rH(°) is decreasing while rF(°) is increasing in °, if they cross, they do so only
once.
20Equation (15) also reveals that the balance is tilted in favor of market
access when a and Á are large (given (11)) as well as when b, c, and K are
small. Under such circumstances, the elasticities of demand and substitution
of a typical variety (see (4) and (5)) are both small, thus implying that a large
component  of  operating  profits  is  independent  from  the  overall  distribution  of
firms.  In  particular,  as  intuition  would  have  it,  in  the  limit  case  of  monopoly
(c=  0)  only  market  access  considerations  matter  since  a  firm’s  operating
profits  are  unrelated  to  other  firms’  locations.  Finally,  the  balance  between
market  access  and  crowding  is  also  affected  by  the  level  of  trade  costs  in  that
access considerations dominate for low trade costs, while crowding concerns
are crucial for large trade costs. The reason why is that, with lower trade
costs,  a  larger  fraction  of  operating  profits  is  independent  from  the  overall
location  of  firms.
Solving  (13)  for°,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  location  of  firms:
°
M = ¾ +
4aÁ ¡ ¿(2bÁ + cK)
¿cK
(2¾ ¡ 1) (16)
so that °M is alway larger than ¾ whenever ¾ > 1=2 and less than 1 whenever
¿ is larger than
¿cluster ´
4aÁ(2¾ ¡ 1)
2bÁ(2¾ ¡ 1) + cK
(17)
When ¿ falls short of this threshold the modern sector is clustered inside
country H and country F is completely specialized in the production of the
traditional good. Therefore, the incomplete specialization of F is compatible








which showsthat the modern sector ismorelikely tocluster the larger country
H  (larger¾),  the  higher  the  degree  of  product  differentiation  (lowerc),  the
more intense the returns to scale (larger Á). When (18) is violated trade
always leadstocomplete specialization of the larger country in the production
of the modern good.
The fact that °M is always larger than ¾ (given ¾ > 1=2) reveals the
existence of a HME: the larger country H attracts a more than proportionate












This is indeed the value of ¿ that erases the market access advantage in (15).
Therefore, since ¿HME = 2¿trade > ¿trade, trade is always associated with
a HME. Moreover, by comparing (20) with (17), it is easy to notice that
¿HME is the maximum value of ¿cluster achieved at ¾ = 1. Therefore, we
have also ¿HME > ¿cluster.
The  equilibrium  capital  flow  fromF  toH  is:
CFFH ´ (°
M ¡ ¾)K =
(2¾ ¡ 1)[4aÁ ¡ ¿(2bÁ + cK)]
2¿c
(21)
which is positive given (11). Of course, this is also a measure of relocation
defined  as(°M  ¡¾)N  =CFFH=Á. By (21), the extent of relocation is a
decreasing function of c as well as K and an increasing function of a as well
as Á for the same reasons discussed above. Moreover, it is also a decreasing
function  of¿,  implying  that  capital  flows  grow  as  trade  costs  fall.  Interest-
ingly enough, since, as it can be easily shown, the total trade volume is also
a decreasing function of ¿, the model predicts that foreign direct investment
and international trade grow together as economic integration deepens. As a
result, the larger country H increasingly exchanges the modern good against
the  services  of  both  factors.  In  the  case  of  capital  the  inflow  is  direct,  while
in the case of labor it is embodied in traditional imports.
5 The e¢cient outcome
In  principle  the  model  has  two  potential  sources  of  inefficiency.  On  the  one
side, for a given spatial distribution °, when pricing above marginal cost,
firms  do  not  take  into  account  the  social  loss  in  terms  of  consumer  surplus.  On
the other, for given prices, when choosing location they do not consider the
impact  of  their  decisions  on  competitors’  profits  and  consumers’  surpluses.
Notice  however  that,  differently  from  Dixit  and  Stiglitz  (1977),  in  the present
setting the total number of firmsN is always efficient since, as a consequence
of (2) and (3), that number is determined by the total endowment of K and
the technology parameter Á.
22Consider initially a …rst-best planner who has enough instrumentsto elim-
inate  all  sources  of  inefficiency.  In  other  words,  assume  that  the  planner  is
able  (i)  to  assign  any  number  of  firms  to  a  specific  country  and  (ii)  to  use
lump-sum  transfers  from  workers  to  pay  for  the  loss  firms  may  incur  while
pricing at marginal cost. The planner chooses ° in order to maximize the
following social welfare function (recall that individual utilities are quasi-
linear):
W(°) = SH(°)¾L + SF(°)(1 ¡ ¾)L (22)
+rH(°)°K + rF(°)(1 ¡ °)K + constant
which is simply the sum of all workers’ indirect utilities and where all prices
have been set equal to marginal cost:
pHH = pFF = 0 and pHF = pFH = ¿
The planner actually engages in international trade as long as consumers
want to buy foreign varieties (qHF, qFH > 0), which is the case if and only if








trade < ¿trade, as in Brander and Krugman (1983), there is a range of
relatively  large  but  not  prohibitive  trade  costs  in  which  inefficient  commerce
takes  place  at  the  market  outcome  due  to  the  dumping  behavior  of  firms.
Up  to  a  positive  multiplicative  constant,  the  first  order  condition  of  the
planner’s problem is:
¿[2aÁ ¡ ¿(bÁ + cK)](¾ ¡ 1=2) ¡ ¿
2cK(° ¡ ¾) = 0 (24)
Straightforward comparison with (15) showsthat theplanner giveslessweight
to market access than the decentralized outcome. This happens for the fol-
lowing reason. Starting with ° = ¾ > 1=2, as ° rises, the local sales of
each  firm  inH  go  down  while  its  distant  sales  go  up.  The  opposite  happens
to  firms  inF.  However,  given°  =¾>1=2,  the  net  result  is  an  increase
in aggregate shipments and thus in aggregate trade costs. The fact that
the  planner  internalizes  this  effect  explains  why  the  social  weight of market
access falls short of the private one.11
11The Appendix solves the trade costs minimization problem to argue that transport
saving is indeed the driving force behind the HME. That is why some degree of HME is
always optimal.
23Solving  (24)  in°  yields  the  first  best  spatial  distribution  of  firms:
°
O ´ ¾ +
2aÁ ¡ ¿(bÁ + cK)
¿cK
(2¾ ¡ 1) > ¾ (25)
which, under (23), implies that also the planner delivers a HME by allocating
a  more  than  proportionate  share  of  firms  in  the  larger  country.  However,  since
clearly°O  <°M,  the  market  outcome  has  an  inefficiently  large  number  of
firms in countryH. Moreover, such inefficiency is larger the stronger the
decentralized HME: d°O=d¾ = (1=2)(d°M=d¾) > 1.
While  the  first-best  planner  is  an  interesting  benchmark,  in  reality  marginal
cost  pricing  is  diffcult  to  implement  because  of  the  lack  of  the  lump-sum  in-
struments involved. It is therefore useful to consider the choice of a second-
best  planner  who  is  able  to  assign  any  number  of  modern  firms  to  a  specific
country  but  is  unable  to  use  lump-sum  transfers  from  workers  to  firms.  In
this case, the planner chooses° in order to maximize (22) evaluated at market
prices (7)-(10) so that she engages in trade if and only if (11) holds.
The  second-best  first  order  condition  is:
¿[8aÁ(3bÁ+cK)¡3¿(2bÁ+cK)
2](¾¡1=2)¡¿
2cK(8bÁ+3cK)(°¡¾) = 0 (26)
which implies that, relative to market crowding, market access is overweighed
with  respect  to  the  first  best,  and  underweighed  with  respect  to  the  decen-
tralized  outcome.  As  the  first  best  planner,  the  second  best  one  internalizes
the  adverse  trade  cost  surcharge  that  additional  firms  inH  impose  on  local
incumbents.  However,  since  under  monopolistically  competitive  pricing  firms
absorb part of the trade costs (pHF ¡pHH < ¿), the surcharge is smaller than
under marginal cost pricing.
Solving  (26)  in°  yields  the  second-best  spatial  distribution  of  firms:
°
S ´ ¾ +
8aÁ(3bÁ + cK) ¡ 3¿(2bÁ + cK)2
2¿cK(8bÁ + 3cK)
(2¾ ¡ 1) (27)
which, given (11), implies that also the second-best planner delivers a HME.
In particular, we have d°S=d¾ = [(6bÁ+2cK)=(8bÁ+3cK)](d°M=d¾) so that
d°M=d¾ > d°S=d¾ > d°O=d¾ > 1.




Á(2a ¡ ¿b)(2bÁ + cK)(2¾ ¡ 1)
¿cK(8bÁ + 3cK)
> 0 (28)
24so  that  the  market  outcome  leads  to  too  much  concentration  also  with  respect
to  the  second-best  allocation;  the  more  so  the  stronger the HME. It is also




Á(2a ¡ ¿b)(4bÁ + cK)(2¾ ¡ 1)
2¿cK(8bÁ+3cK)
>0  (29)
This  suggests  that  both  sources  of  inefficiency  work  in  the  same direction
by  supporting  a  spatial  distribution  of  firms  that  is  too  uneven.  Notice  also
that(°S  ¡°O)<(°M  ¡°S)  so  that  the  second-best  is  closer  to  the first-best
than  to  the  market  outcome.  Finally,  the  discrepancies  between°M,°S,  and
°O  grow  as¿  falls:  economic  integration  widens  the  gap  between  market  and
e¢cient outcomes.
6 Policy implications
How  can  a  policy  maker  implement  the  efficient spatial distribution of firms?
Are  EU  policies  going  in  the  right  direction?  To  answer  these  questions  we
have  to  consider once  more  the  logic  of  the  model. For concreteness, we
target the second-best allocation.
Modern  firms’  location is determined by capital owners decisions on the
provision  of  their  services.  These  decisions  are  guided  by  the  differential
between  the  returns  to  capital  in  the  two  countries,[rH(°S)¡rF(°S)].  Since
such  differential  decreases  with°  (see  (13))  being  zero  at°M  and°S  is  smaller
than°M,  then  it  must  be  that[rH(°S)  ¡rF(°S)] > 0, that is, at °S there
is a positive gap between capital returns in the larger country H  and  in  the
smaller countryF. Any policy tool that is able to fill in that gap will achieve
the second best.




(2¾ ¡ 1)2(2a ¡ ¿b)2(bÁ + cK)L
8c(8bÁ+3cK) 
(30)
which  increases  as  the  level  of  trade  costs  falls.  In  other  words,  economic
integration  increases  the  welfare  loss  due  to  the  ine¢cient  spatial  disitribution
of …rms at the market outcome.
With the practices of the EU in mind, we consider an investment subsidy
to  the  fixed  costs  of  firms  inF  levied  through  income  taxation.12  Lets¤  be
12Given quasi-linear utility and workers’ ownership of capital, the exact way income
taxes are raised is immaterial in so far as we think in terms of a net investment subsidy.
25the optimal investment subsidy per unit of capital invested in F. Then, s¤ is
such that [rH(°S) ¡ rF(°S) ¡s¤] = 0 implying:
s
¤ =
¿L(2a ¡ ¿b)(bÁ + cK)(2¾ ¡ 1)
2Á(8bÁ + 3cK)
(31)
This shows that the optimal subsidy is an increasing function of the trade
costs ¿ (since (11) holds), the total capital stock K, the substitutability
between varieties c, while it is a decreasing function of the intensity of returns
to scale Á. Consequently, as trade costs fall, the optimal subsidy shrinks: as
countries  get  more  integrated,  the  overall  welfare  loss  due  to  the  inefficient
distribution  of  modern  firms  rises,  but,  at  the  same  time,  the  amount  of
international redistribution needed to restore e¢ciency falls. The explanation
is  that,  as  trade  cost  fall,  firms  become  increasingly  footloose.  While,  on  the
one side, this fosters their inefficient concentration in the larger country, on
the  other  it  makes  them  more  sensitive  to  any  differential  in  subsidies.13  The
same  effects  are  associated  with  falling c and rising Á.
7 Conclusion
A distinguishing feature of new trade models is the so-called  home  market
effect,  that  is,  in  the  case  of  two  countries, the more than proportionate
location of imperfectly competitive increasing-return sectors in the larger
country. However, despite its centrality and the  distortions  at  its  origin,  so
far  the  home  market  effect  has  attracted surprisingly little attention in terms
of its global welfare implications.
This  paper  represents  a  first  step  in  the  direction  of  filling  that  gap.  Us-
ing a simple new trade model, it has shown that sectors characterized by
increasing  returns  to  scale  and  imperfect  competition  tend  to  be  inefficiently
over-concentrated in the larger country, the more so the lower trade costs
are. This implies that, in the process of integration, the demand for active
policy intervention to reduce economic disparities between large (‘central’)
13One may wonder then why the EU regional budget has been growing through time?
The answer is ongoing enlargement. In the present model, the simplest way to capture
the joint phenomena of deeper integration between old central members and additional
inclusion of new peripheral ones is to have ¾ rising (the center grows) and ¿ rising (the
periphery gets more distant) at the same time. On both counts, by (31), the optimal
subsidy rises.
26countries and small (‘peripheral’) ones may stand not only on equity but also
on efficiency grounds. However, industry-specific characteristics are likely to
determine  the  practical  relevance  of  spatial  inefficiency.  Accordingly,  dif-
ferently from current EU practice, regional policies should be targeted not
only  to  specific  peripheral  regions  but  also  to  specific  sectors  characterized
by  steeply  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  strong  firms’  market  power.
Stemming  from  a  first  attempt,  these  results  are  obviously  preliminary
and  should  be  qualified  by  studying  more  general  models  of  the  HME.  As
discussed in the introduction, in the wake of existing results, such models
should be built on two main pillars. First, the HME is essentially a partial
equilibrium phenomenon that might be washed away by general equilibrium
interactions. Consequently, one should focus on a sector insulated from the
rest  of  the  economy.  Second,  the  HME  can  be  defined  only  when  countries
differ  in  nothing  but  market  access.  So  far,  in  the  absence  of  a  benchmark
measure of market access with many countries, one should concentrate on a
two-country economy where market access is simply captured by local market
size.
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Appendix
The aim of this appendix is to show that the essence of the reason why the
first  best  planner  delivers  a  HME  is  trade  costs  minimization.14.  Accordingly,
consider the problem of minimizing aggregate trade costs under marginal cost
pricing (pHH = pFF = 0, pHF = pFH = ¿):
min
° ¿[qFH(1 ¡ °)¾ + qHF°(1 ¡ ¾)] (A1)
where, given (4) and (5), quantities shipped are:
qFH = a¡(b+cN)pFH+cN[°pHH +(1¡°)pFH] = a¡(b+cN)¿+¿c(1¡°)N
(A2)
qHF = a¡(b+cN)pHF+cN[°pHF+(1¡°)pFF] = a¡(b+cN)¿+¿c°N (A3)








where  the  first  term  inside  the  curly  brackets  refers  to  the  spatial  distri-
bution of the component of individual import demands that is common to
all consumers no matter where they reside. The associated trade costs are
clearly  minimized  when  all  firms  are  located  in  the  bigger  region  (whenever
trade costs are low enough to allow for trade). As to the second term inside
the curly brackets, it concerns the spatial distribution of the component of
individual  import  demands  that  depends  on  the  location  of  firms.  This  is  a
convex function of ° with a minimum at ° = ¾.
The corresponding necessary condition for minimization is:
¿[aÁ ¡ ¿(bÁ + cK)](¾ ¡ 1=2) ¡ ¿
2cK(° ¡ ¾) = 0 (A4)
14Indeed, in the present setting, since marginal costs are zero, trade costs minimization
is equivalent to total costs minimization.
30where we have used the fact that N = K=Á. Condition (A4) shows that
trade  costs  minimization  gives  less  weight  to  market  access  than  the  first
best outcome. It can be readily solved in ° to yield
°
T = ¾ +
[aÁ ¡ ¿(bÁ + cK)]
2¿cK
(2¾ ¡ 1) > ¾ (A5)
where the inequality is granted by (23).







which  is,  however,  less  pronounced  than  in  the  first  best  case  (°O  >°T  )  as
it  can  be  readily  verified  by  comparing  (A5)  with  (25).
Given previous discussions, the HME is entirely driven by the minimiza-
tion of trade costs associated with the component of individual import de-
mands that is common to all consumers no matter where they reside.
31